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possessed no power to accumulate income because of pressure
of adverse death tax consequences if QTIP not available).
6 I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii).  See Est. of Boydstun v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1984-312, aff'd without pub. op., 774 F.2d 1173
(9th Cir. 1985) (spouse's life estate interest in trust not eligible
for marital deduction as qualified terminable interest property
because spouse did not have power over corpus).
7 Est. of Kyle v. Comm’r, 94 T.C. 829 (1990).
8 Ltr. Rul. 9229004, March 31, 1992 (surviving spouse to
receive decedent's home "subject...to the condition of his
occupancy...." not a qualifying income interest for life because
surviving spouse could neither convey residence nor obtain
rent from it); Ltr. Rul. 8651002, Aug. 12, 1986 (devise of right
of occupancy in decedent's residence to surviving spouse not
eligible QTIP because interest based on occupancy and not life
of surviving spouse).
9 Ltr. Rul. 8736004, May 22, 1987.
10
  Ltr. Rul. 8742001, June 30, 1987 (failure to live in residence
for at least one month in any calendar year).
11 Ltr. Rul. 8843004, July 27, 1988 (proceeds of sale to be
distributed to decedent's child).
12 Ltr. Rul. 9040001, July 8, 1990 (50 percent of proceeds held in
trust for spouse for life produced QTIP as to 50 percent).
13 Ltr. Rul. 9033004, no date given.
14 Ltr. Rul. 9126020, March 20, 1991.
15 Est. of Peacock v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,051
(11th Cir. 1990).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
FENCE. An owner of a large tract of farm land sold the
northern half to the defendants and the southern half to the
parents of the plaintiffs. The tracts were separated by a
fence which meandered back and forth over the true
boundary. Both parties testified that they did not consider
the fence as the true boundary. The plaintiffs used the
disputed property as pasture land, first as tenants of their
parents and as full owners. The defendants used the disputed
property as a trash dump and as a drain point for a sewer
line. The court held that the plaintiffs’ title to the disputed
property could not be acquired by adverse possession
through mutual recognition of the fence as the boundary
because neither party ever considered the fence as the true
boundary.  In addition, the plaintiffs did not have exclusive
possession of the disputed property because both parties
made continuous use of the property. Thornburg v.
Haeker, 502 N.W.2d 434 (Neb. 1993).
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].* The debtor entered
into a series of contracts for the sale and purchase of a horse
and its foals in order to create a tax shelter for the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs paid $15,000 to the debtor as “interest” on a
promissory note given for the horse and claimed the
payment as a deduction on the 1982 federal tax return. The
deduction was disallowed by the IRS which considered the
transactions as shams. The plaintiffs sought to have their
claims against the debtor declared nondischargeable for
misrepresentation and fraud. The court held that the claims
were dischargeable because the plaintiffs did not rely on the
representations of the debtor as to the tax deductibility of
the interest payments since the plaintiffs knew that the
transactions would not produce bona fide tax deductions. In
re Farley, 156 B.R. 486 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[3]*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed a homestead
exemption for the equity remaining after a mortgage. The
debtors sought to avoid a pre-petition judgment lien against
the homestead as impairing their exemption. The court held
that because the judgment lien exceeded the debtors’
exemption amount, the lien was completely avoided. In re
Osborne, 156 B.R. 188 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption. The
homestead was subject to four liens in the following priority
order: (1) a judgment lien, (2) a creditor’s judgment lien, (3)
an unavoidable federal tax lien, and (4) a county tax lien. the
debtor sought avoidance of the second lien as impairing the
homestead exemption. The creditor argued that because the
amount of the first two liens did not exceed the fair market
value of the house less the exemption amount, the liens did
not impair the exemption but that the later liens were the
ones which impaired the exemption. The court held that the
priority of the liens did not affect the impairment issue and
allowed avoidance of the second lien. In re Bradshaw, 156
B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1993).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption and sought
to avoid a judgment lien against the house. The Bankruptcy
Court had avoided the entire $92,000 lien, although the
exemption amount was only $12,000.  The creditor argued
that the house was already exempt from the lien under Utah
law; therefore, no impairment existed. The appellate court
reversed, holding that the homestead exemption was not
impaired because the lien could not affect the homestead
exemption under state law.  In addition, the court held that
the entire lien could not be avoided but that the lien could
have been avoided only to the extent of the impaired
exemption amount. In re Sanders, 156 B.R. 667 (D. Utah
1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor filed a declaration of
homestead post-petition and sought avoidance of judgment
liens impairing the exemption. The debtor vacated the
property the day after filing the homestead declaration and
applied for court approval of the sale of the property. The
court held that the post-petition declaration of homestead
and sale of the property did not affect the debtor’s right to
the exemption; however, the court ordered a hearing as to
whether the declaration of homestead was truthful in that the
debtor’s actions were contrary to the declaration that the
debtor intended to use the property as a residence. In re
Zohner, 156 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1993).
More than three years before filing for Chapter 7, the
debtor disposed of several non-exempt assets and used the
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proceeds to purchase a house for which the debtor claimed a
homestead exemption. The transactions also occurred some
time before the claims of the bankruptcy creditors arose.
The court allowed the exemption because the trustee and
creditors failed to show any evidence of fraudulent intent to
harm the creditors. In re Rightmeyer, 156 B.R. 690
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
PENSION PLAN.  The debtor owned an interest in a
retirement plan and received disability payments from the
plan.  Although the debtor was suspended from employment
without pay at the time of the petition, the debtor was
considered still employed and could not withdraw funds
from the retirement plan. The debtor also received payments
from an annuity contract established as part of a settlement
of a personal injury action.  The court held that under
Section 541(c)(2), the retirement plan was not estate
property because the debtor had no access to the funds in the
plan, except for the disability payments which were exempt.
The court also held that the annuity contract was not a
spendthrift trust because the debtor was involved in the
creation of the contract. Under Section 522(d)(11)(D), the
debtor was allowed an exemption for the first $7,500
received post-petition, but the remainder of the contract was
estate property. In re Ziegler, 156 B.R. 151 (Bankr. W.D.
Wis. 1993).
TRUSTS. The debtor was a trust which owned and
operated an apartment complex. The trust was 50 percent
owned by the trustee and the trustee’s spouse and 50 percent
by third parties who acquired their interest in satisfaction of
a debt owed by the trustee. The trustee operated the
apartments through an unrelated management company and
the trustee and spouse received all the distributions from the
trust. The court held that although the trust shared several
aspects of a corporation, such as limited liability, the trust
was not a business trust eligible for Chapter 11 because the
trust was not formed by a group of investors with the intent
to operate a business for profit. The court focused on the
fact that the 50 percent interest owned by the third parties
was not acquired by investment and did not have any right
to trust income. In re Westgate Village Realty Trust, 156
B.R. 363 (Bankr. D. N.H. 1993).
    CHAPTER 11   
TRUSTEE-ALM § 13.03[1]. * The debtor was a
partnership comprised of two general partners which were
also partnerships. The partners were engaged in litigation
over their respective interests in the debtor and over the
debtor’s timber sales contracts. One partner applied to have
a trustee appointed in the debtor’s Chapter 11 case, arguing
that the adversarial relationship between the partners
required the appointment of a trustee to manage the debtor’s
affairs. The court held that a trustee would be appointed
because of the deadlock between the two general partners of
the debtor. Matter of Tahkenitch Tree Farm Partnership,
156 B.R. 525 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8].* The Chapter 12 debtor's plan
provided for payment in full of a secured creditor's claim by
transferring some of the real property securing the claim to
the creditor sufficient, at the value set by the bankruptcy
court, to repay the creditor.  The plan was confirmed over
the objections of the secured creditor who argued that the
creditor should have retained a lien on the remainder of the
collateral real property to cover any deficiency upon sale of
the property transferred under the plan.  On appeal, the
District Court agreed with the creditor, holding that 11
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(C) required transfer of all property
securing a creditor's lien before a plan could be confirmed
over objection of the creditor.  On remand, the Bankruptcy
Court affirmed the plan after the debtor modified the plan to
include a lien for the secured creditor on unsurrendered
property. On appeal of that decision, the District Court
affirmed the plan but removed the requirement that the
creditor retain a lien on the debtor’s remaining property.
The appellate court affirmed.  In re Kerwin-White, 996
F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g, 129
B.R. 375 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991), on rem. from, 109 B.R.
627 (D. Vt. 1990).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . The debtor
corporation had a June 1 taxable year and filed a Chapter 11
petition on December 27, 1989. The debtor paid the
corporate income taxes for December 28, 1989 through May
30, 1990 and the IRS sought administrative expense status
for the taxes for the June 1, 1989 through December 27,
1989 period, arguing that the taxes were assessable post-
petition. The court held that the bankruptcy estate was not
liable for the pre-petition taxes as an administrative expense.
In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 156 B.R. 318 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1993).
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor operated a trucking
business and contracted with a third party to haul goods.
The IRS served a notice of levy on the third party for the
money due to the debtor from the hauling contract. Before
the third party made any payments under the levy, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy and notified the IRS of the
filing. The third party paid the IRS the full amount of the
levy post-petition. The debtor sought damages from the IRS
under Section 362 for violation of the automatic stay. The
debtor did not seek return of the levied funds but sought
damages for the loss of business resulting from the debtor’s
inability to use the levied-against funds. The court held that
the damages would not be allowed because the funds would
not have been available to the debtor but would have been
estate property. In re Wright, 156 B.R. 549 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1992).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors owned a residence
for which they claimed a homestead exemption. The debtors
also owed taxes, penalties and interest which were
dischargeable in their bankruptcy case.  However, the IRS
had filed a pre-petition tax lien which attached to the
debtors’ residence. The debtors sought avoidance of the
lien, under Section 506, to the extent the lien exceeded the
value of their property. The court held that the lien could not
be avoided to any extent, even as to exempt property,
because tax liens are not affected by a bankruptcy case
unless the underlying taxes are actually paid. In re
Koppersmith, 156 B.R. 537 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
CLAIMS. The debtor objected to a portion of the IRS
claim for taxes and penalties in that the IRS had not made
any assessment for those taxes. The court held that the IRS
need not have made any assessment on the debtor before
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filing a claim for taxes. In re Davison, 156 B.R. 600
(Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1993).
The debtor originally filed a Chapter 11 case but
converted the case to Chapter 7. After the conversion, the
court established a claims bar date but the IRS filed some
claims more than five years after the bar date for taxes
which accrued during the Chapter 11 case. The IRS argued
that the claims were allowed because either (1)
administrative claims in a converted case are not required to
be filed or (2) the late claims were amendments of the
timely filed claims. The court held that administrative
claims in a converted case are required to be filed in the
subsequent converted case. However, the court held that the
late filed claim for FUTA taxes was allowed because a
claim for FICA taxes for the same period had been timely
filed.  The court also held claims for FICA or FUTA taxes
for periods for which tax claims had not been timely filed
would not be allowed unless the five factors of In re Miss
Glamour Coat, Inc., 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9737 (S.D.
N.Y. 1980), demonstrated that the amendments should be
allowed. The court refused to grant the debtor summary
judgment under these five factors because of an insufficient
record. Matter of All American of Ashburn, Inc., 156
B.R. 696 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The IRS sought to have the debtor’s pre-
petition taxes declared nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(C) because the debtor filed fraudulent returns for
the taxes or wilfully attempted to evade taxes by hiding
assets. The debtor’s nondebtor spouse had made two loans
to the debtor and had received loans from a corporation
which was owned by the debtor’s sons and which employed
the debtor. The debtor and nondebtor spouse kept their
assets separate and filed separate tax returns. The debtor did
not own any interest in the sons’ corporation. The loan
proceeds received by the nondebtor spouse were invested in
the nondebtor spouse’s separate property. The court held
that the debtor did not receive any income from the
nondebtor spouse’s loans to the debtor or from the
corporation; therefore, the debtor did not hide any assets or
income from these transactions and the pre-petition taxes
were dischargeable. In re Cox, 156 B.R. 323 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].*  The
FmHA obtained title to the defendant’s farm land through
foreclosure in 1982. The FmHA leased the land to the
defendant for the 1987 and 1988 crop years under the
lease/buyback program. The FmHA decided to terminate the
lease and sought a court order to remove the defendant from
the property. The defendant argued that the FmHA had not
complied with its regulations in failing to provide the
defendant with a copy of the regulations for the
lease/buyback program, the softwood timber program and
homestead protection program as required by the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987. The court held that the
defendant was not entitled to receive the copy of the
regulations because the requirement applied only to
borrowers and the defendant was not a borrower since the
loans had been foreclosed. The court held that the defendant
was not entitled to the homestead protection provisions
because the defendant failed to timely apply for the program
after receiving the application from the FmHA. The court
also held that the defendant was not eligible for the
softwood timber program because the defendant was not a
borrower. United States v. Rode Corp., 825 F. Supp. 221
(W.D. Wis. 1993).
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.* The FCIC has
issued an interim rule allowing a six month delay in the
payment of premiums for the 1994 nursery crop insurance
policies issued in counties in Florida affected by Hurricane
Andrew. 58 Fed. Reg. 46073 (Sept. 1, 1993).
FARM LOANS. The FmHA has adopted as final
regulations identifying the type of security that can be
routinely sold and the proceeds used to pay for essential
family living and farm operating expenses. 58 Fed. Reg.
46074 (Sept. 1, 1993).
HERBICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs were
highway workers who claimed physical injuries from
herbicides they applied which were manufactured by the
defendants. The plaintiff’s suit was based on the defendant's
negligence for failure to warn of the dangers from use of the
herbicides. The defendants claimed that their registration
and approval of the herbicides under FIFRA preempted any
state tort action for failure to warn. Although the court noted
contrary case precedent, the court held that FIFRA
preempted state tort action for failure to warn. The court
noted that a state tort action may be allowed if the failure to
warn involved a failure to warn by means other than a label.
In this case, the plaintiffs alleged only a failure to provide a
warning on the defendant’s products. King v. E.I. Du Pont
Nemours & Co., 996 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1993), aff’g, 806
F. Supp. 1030 (D. Me. 1992).
The plaintiff had been using the herbicide Treflan,
manufactured by one defendant, on soybean crops with
subsequent plantings of milo. The plaintiff was approached
by a seller of Bicep, manufactured by the other defendant, to
use that herbicide because it was safe when used on
“safened” milo seed. The plaintiff did not inform the Bicep
manufacturer that Treflan had been used on the field in the
previous year. The plaintiff sued both manufacturers for
failing to warn about using Bicep on Milo in years after
using Treflan. The court held that because the labels on both
herbicides complied with FIFRA, the failure to warn action
was pre-empted by FIFRA. Hopkins v. Ciba-Geigy Corp.,
432 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
GRAZING PERMITS. The plaintiff purchased a ranch
in 1991. The previous owners had a grazing permit for the
land but the permit was revoked in 1990. The previous
owners sought administrative appeal of the revocation but
did not pursue judicial review of the revocation. After the
purchase of the ranch, the plaintiff sought judicial review of
the revocation. The court held that the plaintiff did not have
standing to bring the appeal because the plaintiff did not
suffer any personal injury from the revocation. The court
found that the permits were fully revocable at the discretion
of the Forest Service and were not assignable. The court
held that the Forest Service practice of routinely granting
buyers a grazing permit granted to the sellers was not
sufficient to require the Forest Service to grant the permit to
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all purchasers. Fulton v. U.S., 825 F. Supp. 259 (D. Nev.
1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent died in 1988 with a will executed in
1959. The will provided for a trust funded with the residuary
estate. The trust beneficiaries included the decedent’s
grandchildren. The decedent’s executor filed the estate tax
return but did not include certification or other evidence that
the decedent was incompetent on October 22, 1986 until
death, thus exempting the trust from GSTT. The IRS
allowed a late filing of the certification evidence. Ltr. Rul.
9335004, May 18, 1993.
The decedent died in 1974 leaving a trust for a son with
the decedent’s two brothers as cotrustees with a bank
trustee. Although a sister was named as a successor trustee,
no other successor trustees were named by the will or trust.
Because of their advanced age, the trustees petitioned a state
probate court to have additional family members made
eligible successor cotrustees. The IRS ruled that the naming
of other successor trustees by a state probate court would
not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9334030, May 25,
1993.
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY FOR ESTATE TAX.
The debtor was the personal representative for the estate of
the debtor’s deceased father and filed the 1984 final income
tax return for the decedent on April 15, 1985 and did not
request any refund. The IRS sent a letter to the debtor
requesting the filing of Form 1310 and evidence that the
debtor was appointed as the decedent’s personal
representative. On August 19, 1985, the IRS assessed tax
against the estate of the decedent and on October 2, 1989,
assessed the tax against the debtor as transferee of the
decedent’s property. The debtor argued that the tax was
assessed after the period of limitations for assessment, four
years and 150 days after the filing of a complete return. The
IRS argued that the return was not complete until the debtor
filed Form 1310 in July 1985, making the assessment less
than four years and 150 days after the filing of the complete
return. The court held that Form 1310 was not required
because the decedent’s return did not seek a refund;
therefore, the return was complete on April 15, 1985 and the
IRS assessment against the debtor was untimely. In re
Dobisch, 156 B.R. 546 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1993).
   TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-ALM
§ 5.02[3].* Within three years of the decedent's death and
when the decedent was in remission from cancer, the
decedent transferred the residence to a sole heir in exchange
for a mortgage, less $20,000 as a gift.  The sale contract
allowed the decedent to live in the house for rent equal to
the interest payments on the mortgage. In the penultimate
and last year of the decedent's life, another $20,000 of
mortgage was forgiven each year.  The decedent's will also
caused the remaining amount on the mortgage to be
forgiven.  The court held that the substance of the
transaction was only an attempt to avoid tax and included
the entire value of the residence in the decedent's estate. Est.
of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,145 (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g, 98 T.C. 594 (1992).
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
ACCOUNTING METHOD-ALM § 4.01.*  The
taxpayer was a corporation with a subsidiary corporation
which operated a poultry and egg business, raising chickens
and turkeys for eggs and meat for grocery chains, wholesale
food distributors and the food service industry. The
subsidiary used the farm-price method of valuing
inventories and valued its chickens and turkeys at zero for
inventory purposes, arguing that the poultry had no current
value because the corporation did not sell the poultry to
outside markets. The corporation's inventory included
breeder eggs, breeder hens, pullets, laying hens, broilers,
and “spent” hens.  The corporation argued that the poultry
had a value only upon reaching marketable age, in the case
of breeders and broilers, or when the laying hens no longer
produced eggs and would be sold as “spent” hens. Citing
Garth v. Comm’r, 56 T.C. 610 (1971), acq., 1975-1 C.B. 1,
the IRS ruled that the laying and breeder hens must be
valued each year at the “spent” hen value less the direct
costs of disposition, regardless of the age of the poultry. The
IRS also ruled that the poultry raised for meat are to be
valued at market value which would increase as the poultry
reached maturity. The actual value of the corporation’s
inventory was a question of fact not determinable in a
technical advice memorandum.  Ltr. Rul. 9334003, May 6,
1993.
C CORPORATIONS
STOCK EXCHANGES. The taxpayer owned 400 of the
1,000 shares of a corporation. The taxpayer agreed to
exchange the stock for all of the stock of a subsidiary
corporation plus cash. The IRS ruled that in determining
whether the boot received by the taxpayer was to be taxed as
a dividend distribution, the transaction was to be reordered
such that the boot was to be considered as paid for the
amount of the corporation’s stock equal in value to the boot.
If the exchange of the boot for stock would result in a
substantially disproportionate decrease in the taxpayer’s
stock share before the exchange of the remaining stock, the
boot was taxable as a dividend distribution. Rev. Rul. 93-
62, I.R.B. 1993-30.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].*  The IRS has
issued tables, revised for inflation, detailing the limitation
on depreciation deductions for automobiles first placed in
service during 1993:
   Tax Year      Amount  
1st tax year ........................................... $2,860
2d tax year ..............................................4,600
3d tax year ..............................................2,750
Each succeeding year ............................. 1,675
The IRS also issued tables providing the amounts to be
included in income for automobiles first leased during 1993.
Rev. Proc. 93-35, I.R.B. 1992-28, 51.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The
taxpayer sued a former employer for age discrimination
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act
and won a verdict for damages, judgment interest on that
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award and punitive damages. The court held that the award
was excludible from income but that the judgment interest
and punitive damages were includible in gross income. Rice
v. U.S., 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,488 (E.D. Cal.
1993).
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for
the period October  1, 1993 through December 31, 1993, the
interest rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 6 percent
and for underpayments remains at 7 percent. The interest
rate for underpayments by large corporations remains at 9
percent. Rev. Rul. 93-63.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04.*  The
taxpayer was a corporation which agreed to sell some of its
assets to another corporation in exchange for stock in a
“type D” reorganization. The agreement required the
taxpayer corporation to transfer its remaining assets to a
new corporation in another “type D” reorganization. A
portion of these assets were Section 38 property for which
ITC had been taken by the taxpayer. The taxpayer and the
new corporation filed consolidated returns and the taxpayer
argued that because the transfer of assets occurred between
members of a consolidated group, no ITC was recaptured.
The court held that under Rev. Rul. 82-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6
and Salomon, Inc. v. U.S., 976 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1992), ITC
was recaptured in a divisive “type D” reorganization. Walt
Disney, Inc. v. Comm’r, 93-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,484 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 97 T.C. 221 (1991).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations governing the minimum coverage requirements
under I.R.C. § 410(b). 58 Fed. Reg. 46835 (Sept. 3, 1993).
The IRS has adopted as final regulations under I.R.C. §
401(l) providing for disparity in employer contributions to,
and employer-provided benefits under, qualified plans. 58
Fed. Reg. 46828 (Sept. 3, 1993).
The IRS has adopted as final regulations under I.R.C. §
401(a)(4) interpreting the requirement that contributions or
benefits provided under a tax-qualified retirement plan not
discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees. 58
Fed. Reg. 46773 (Sept. 3, 1993).
The IRS has issued proposed regulations under I.R.C. §
414(r) implementing the provision that an employer may be
treated as operating separate lines of business for purposes
of applying the minimum coverage requirements of I.R.C. §
410(b). 58 Fed. Reg. 47090 (Sept. 7, 1993).
The IRS has adopted as final regulations under I.R.C. §
414(s) governing the definition of compensation for
qualified plans. 58 Fed. Reg. 47061 (Sept. 7, 1993).
REAL ESTATE TAXES . The taxpayers had been
living in a residence under a written lease-purchase
agreement and continued to live in the house after the
agreement expired. The taxpayers claimed mortgage interest
and real estate tax deductions for amounts paid after the
agreement expired. The court held that the deductions were
not allowed because the taxpayers failed to prove that they
owned the house or that the payments were made under a
valid purchase agreement. Dively v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-395.
RESPONSIBLE PERSON. The debtor was a general
partner in a partnership which had the debtor’s siblings as
the other partners. The debtor did not participate in the
management of the partnership. The debtor’s brother
managed the partnership which was responsible for the
payroll accounting of several corporations which failed to
pay federal employment taxes. The IRS assessed the I.R.C.
§ 6672 responsible person 100 percent penalty against the
partnership and to the debtor for the debtor’s share of
partnership expenses. The debtor argued that the brother had
control of the partnership and corporations and should be
the only person assessed the penalty. The court held that the
evidence demonstrated that the brother’s actions were in
furtherance of the partnership business; therefore, the
partnership, and the debtor, were the “responsible person”
liable for the penalty. Matter of Elms, 156 B.R. 519
(Bankr. E.D. La. 1993).
SALE OF STOCK. An S corporation sold S
corporation stock at a loss and the shareholders reported the
loss as an ordinary loss on their individual income tax
returns, although the corporation did not report the sale or
loss on its tax return. The court held that the ordinary loss
treatment from the sale of S corporation stock was available
only to individuals and partnerships; therefore the loss had
to be reported by the corporation and the shareholders as a
capital loss. Rath v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. No. 13 (1993).
SOIL CONSERVATION EXPENSES-ALM §
4.03[1].* A U.S. citizen owned and operated a farm in a
foreign country and incurred soil and water conservation
expenses in accordance with a conservation plan approved
by the government of the foreign country. The IRS ruled
that the expenses were not eligible for the I.R.C. § 175(a)
deduction of the expenses in the taxable year the expenses
were incurred because the statute requires that the expenses
be made by a plan approved by the U.S. Soil Conservation
Service or a comparable state agency. Rev. Rul. 93-56,
I.R.B. 1993-28, 5.
PARTNERSHIPS
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY-ALM § 7.03[1][d].*
The plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff’s son, operated a
construction business as a partnership. The plaintiff also
owned a ranch and operated the ranch with the partnership.
In order to obtain a low interest rate FmHA loan, the
plaintiff deeded the ranch to the defendant without receiving
any consideration in return. The ranch continued to be
operated under the partnership with no change in either
partner’s share of profits or expenses. The court held that
the ranch remained partnership property because the parties
did not intend to remove the ranch from the partnership.
Holmes v. Holmes, 849 P.2d 1140 (Or. Ct. App. 1993),
mod. by, 855 P.2d 1164 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE. The defendant had
purchased a share in a syndicated Arabian stallion and gave
a promissory note in partial payment. The seller transferred
the note to a related partnership but did not endorse the note.
The note was assigned to the plaintiff by endorsement and
delivery to the plaintiff. In defense of a suit on the note, the
defendant alleged fraud and breach of contract by the
original sellers and violation of the breeding provisions of
the purchase agreement by the plaintiff in failing to allow
the breeding of the stallion on the east coast. The plaintiff
argued that it was not subject to claims against the original
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sellers because the plaintiff was a holder in due course. The
court held that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course
because the original seller did not endorse the note.
However, summary judgment was not granted to the
defendant because a factual issue remained as to whether the
plaintiff knew or should have known about the claims
against the original seller. J.P. Morgan Delaware v. Onyx
Arabians II, Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
EQUIPMENT LEASE.  The debtor had granted a bank
a blanket security interest in the debtor's farm equipment.
After the security interest was perfected, the debtor leased a
tractor from a dealer who sought recovery of the tractor
after the debtor’s default. The lease left several provisions
blank, including the total option purchase price, the total
present value of the tractor, and the minimum guaranteed
rent.  Because of the missing provisions, the court found it
was unable to determine the essential characteristics of the
agreement as a lease or security agreement for a conditional
purchase; therefore, the court held that the agreement would
be construed against the drafting party, the dealer, and
would be held as a security agreement subordinate to the
bank’s prior perfected security interest.  A second creditor
also claimed that it owned several pieces of equipment
which it had leased to the debtor. In the alternative, if the
transaction was held to be a sale, the creditor claimed that it
had filed a financing statement in perfection of a security
interest. In this case, the court found that the debtor’s
signatures on the purported lease and security agreement
were forged; therefore, the court held that no lease existed
and the security interest was not perfected because no valid
security agreement existed. In re Michaels, 156 B.R. 584
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993).
PRIORITY. The debtor owned and operated a farm
equipment dealership and sold tractors manufactured by
Kubota under a floor financing agreement which granted
Kubota a security interest in the tractors in the debtor’s
inventory. Kubota perfected the security interest by filing.
The debtor purchased one of the tractors with funds
borrowed from a bank which perfected a security interest in
the tractor. The debtor did not transfer the proceeds of the
sale to Kubota or inform Kubota about the sale until after
the debtor filed for bankruptcy. Kubota repossessed the
tractor along with the other inventory after the debtor
breached the financing agreement. The bank sought
recovery of the tractor, arguing that its security interest had
priority because the debtor purchased the tractor free of
Kubota’s security interest. The court held that because the
debtor purchased the tractor with knowledge of the
financing agreement and Kubota’s security interest, the sale
was not a bona fide sale and the Kubota security interest
remained valid and superior to the bank’s lien. In re
Dettwiller, 156 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST. The
debtor had granted a bank a blanket security interest in the
debtor's farm equipment. After the security interest was
perfected, the debtor purchased several pieces of equipment
from a dealer, financed through the manufacturer. The
equipment was delivered to the debtor prior to approval of
the financing, resulting in the filing of the purchase money
security interest more than 20 days after delivery of the
equipment to the debtor. The manufacturer argued that the
date of “delivery” should be the date the financing was
approved and not the date the debtor obtained possession.
The court rejected this interpretation of Wis. Stat. §
409.312(4) because it would allow creditors almost
unlimited time to file the purchase money security interest.
In re Michaels, 156 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1993).
SALE OF COLLATERAL. The parties had formed a
partnership to operate a cattle ranch. After the partnership
became indebted to the plaintiff for a substantial amount of
money, the parties recapitalized the business and organized
it as a corporation.  The defendant’s share of the partnership
debt was paid by the plaintiff in exchange for a promissory
note secured by the defendant’s stock in the new
corporation. The plaintiff fired the defendant as manager of
the ranch and sought payment on the note. After the
defendant defaulted on the note, the plaintiff foreclosed on
the stock. After giving the plaintiff notice, the stock was
sold at a public sale to the defendant for $15,000 and the
plaintiff sought a deficiency judgment for the remaining
$179,000 owed on the note by the defendant. The defendant
argued that the sale was unreasonable because no public
market existed for a minority interest in a closely-held
corporation and that the plaintiff had depleted the assets of
the corporation to make the stock worth much less. The
court held that the sale was reasonable because the
defendant failed to provide sufficient evidence of the value
of the stock or the corporation’s assets and failed to provide
an alternative reasonable method of selling the stock. Owen
v. Ostrum, 855 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1993).
STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
FENCES. The defendant’s land was separated by a
section line which was under a public easement for vehicles.
The defendant filed an application with the county board of
supervisors for the construction of fences over the section
line. The application was granted with the provision that the
defendant construct a cattle guard 12 feet wide and a
gateway 24 feet wide so that vehicle traffic could pass over
the section line area. The plaintiff owned noncontiguous
farm land on both sides of the section line but could not
transport through the section several pieces of farm
equipment which were over 24 feet wide. The plaintiff
sought an order requiring the defendant to construct wider
gates, arguing that the current gates violated state law in that
not all vehicles could pass through the gates. The plaintiff
argued that the definition of vehicle was established by N.
D. Cent. Code § 39-01-01(38) and included self-propelled
farm equipment. The court held that the definition in the
statute applied only to public highways and that N. D. Cent.
Code § 24-10-02 required gates wide enough only for
general public vehicles such as cars or pickup trucks. In
addition, the court held that the statute left the width of the
gates to the discretion of the board of supervisors and
refused to reverse the decision here because the plaintiff
presented no evidence that the board acted arbitrarily,
capriciously or unreasonably. Ames v. Rose Township
Board of Supervisors, 502 N.W.2d 845 (N.D. 1993).
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STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE.  The plaintiff landowner
sought an agricultural use exemption from ad valorem
property taxes for two calendar years.  In the first year, the
landowner began preparation for planting barley on land
which had not been planted for many years.  The Tax Court
held that because no crop was planted on January 1 of that
year, the agricultural use exemption was not allowed.  In
the second year, a barley crop was planted but the Tax
Court held that the exemption was not allowed because the
dry farming method of raising barley was too precarious for
a reasonable expectation of profit from the crop. The
appellate court reversed, holding that in the first year, the
criterion is whether the landowner had demonstrated a bona
fide intent to farm the land, and in the the second year, the
plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable expectation
of profit from the non-irrigated barley crop.  Title USA v.
Maricopa County, 855 P.2d 430 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993),
rev’g, 810 P.2d 633 (Ariz. Tax 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
Est. of Frane v. Comm'r, 998 F.2d 567 (8th Cir.
1993), aff’g in part and rev’g in part, 98 T.C. 341 (1992)
(self-cancelling installment notes), see p. 122 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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